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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
DONNITA TUOM, Widow of
DANIEL TUOM,

vs.

Petitioner,

Supreme Court No. 19162

DUANE HALL TRUCKING,
STATE INSURANCE FUND, and
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,:
Respondents.

SUPPLEMENT TO BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS

WRIT OF REVIEW FROM THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Respondents respectfully request this Honorable Court
to consider the following as supplemental to, and elucidation
of, their Brief on Appeal.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED SECTION 35-1-68 AND
SECTION 35-1-71 ARE CONTEMPORANEOUS
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THE LEGISLATURE WHICH
DO NOT CONFLICT AND SHOULD BE INTERPRETED
CONSISTENTLY.
On page 8 of their Brief on Appeal, respondents state:
If, as petitioner argues, an inconsistency
exists between subsections 71(2) and 68,
respondents agree judicial construction

should give greater weight to the more recent
and more specific pronouncement of the
legislature .
• . • Such construction favors Section
35-1-71(2), not subsection 68.
Subsection 71UJ
was amended in 1979, as was subsection 68;
therefore, the more specific pronouncement
between the two should prevail. Subsection 71 ( 21
goes beyond 68 by requiring cohabitation, and
thus it is the more specific.
Respondents reiterate that the legislature amended both subsections
at issue here in 1979.

However, our review of chapter 138, Laws

of Utah, 1979, has persuaded us that any argument for the inconsistency of the two subsections cannot stand.

As the attached

pages, appendix A, from Laws of Utah, 1979, show, the legislature
considered sections 35-1-68 and 35-1-71 together and amended
them in conjunction.

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, on

page 10 of her brief, that section 35-1-71(2)

is "redundant"

and "was not modified to be consistent with the conclusive presumption
provided by Section 35-1-68," section 35-1-71(2) was modified
specifically in order to facilitate the functioning of Section
35-1-68.

Before the 1979 amendments, the language found in the

present Section 35-1-68(2) (b) (i) was designated, simply, Section
35-1-68(2).

Of necessity, therefore, there was no reference

to it in former Section 35-1-71.

When the legislature redesignated

former Section 35-1-68(2) as Section 35-1-68(2) (b) (i), it also
revised former Section 35-1-71 to refer precisely to Section
35-1-68(2) (b) (i).

Section 35-1-71(2) states:

For purposes of payments to be made under
subsection (2) (bl (i) of Section 35-1-68. a
surviving husband or wife shall be presumed
to be wholly dependent upon a spouse with
whom he or she lived at the time of the
2

employee's death.
Payments
which a

to

(emphasis added)

be made under Section 35-1-68(2) {b) {i)

"wholly dependent" person is to receive.

read together,

are those
Therefore,

sections 35-l-68{2)(b){i) and 35-1-71(2) require

the Commission to presume that a spouse who lived with an employee
at the time he or she died was wholly dependent on the employee
and entitled to the payments designated in Section 35-1-68(2) {b){i).
At the same time the legislature revised 35-1-71 (2), it added
"(iv)"

to Section 35-l-68(2)(b).

The effect of "(iv)" is to

include in 35-1-68 a six year period during which the Commission
must presume that a spouse who is determined to be a "wholly
dependent person," because of the presumption defined in Section
35-1-71(2), continues to be a wholly dependent person.

There

is no inconsistency between section 35-1-71(2) and 35-1-68(2) (b) (iv).
Subsection

35-1-71(2) directs the Commission to presume that

a surviving husband or wife was wholly dependent on a spouse
with whom he or she lived at the time of the employee's death.
Section 35-1-68(2) (b) (iv) directs the Commission to presume that
once determined wholly dependent, a spouse continues to be wholly
dependent for six years.
CONCLUSION
Petitioner, on page 11 of her brief, submits that "judicial
construction of legislative acts should give greater weight to
the more specific pronouncement of the legislature."
,,f

sections

·'1

Utah,

The history

35-1-68 and 35-1-71, traced in Chapter 138, Laws

1979, shows that the subsections involved were amended
3

contemporaneously.
pronouncement."
in Snyder

y.

Between the two, there is no "more recent

Respondents submit that, as this Court has advised

Clune, 15 Utah 2d 254, 390 P.3d 915 (1964), (attached

as appendix B), a statute should not be construed or applied
to produce incongruous results which were never intended by the
legislature.

It is possible and reasonable to read the sections

of the statute at issue as consistent with one another.

The

Administrative Law Judge found them compatible, construed them
harmoniously, and reached his decision.
basis for his ratiocination.

There is a reasonable

Therefore, respondents respectfully

request this Court to affirm the order of the Commission.
DATED THIS ..;.3.._Day of October, 1983.
BLACK & MOORE

,

,;:J

BY(!r'M-£~
MES
R. BLACK

BY ~~Ii,
WENDY ~~EY
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The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both
::irm<... or both feet or hoth legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall
ronstitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to
the prOY!SlOnS o[ thl5 Sl'Ctlon and no tentative finding Of permanent total dis·
ability sh.:.dl be required in such instances; in all other cases, however, and
where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some Joss of
bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent disability.
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to pay
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as provided in
secttons 35-1-65, 351-66 and this section, including loss of function. in excess
of 8~ 0/o of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week
for 312 weeks.

Section 3. Section amended.
Section 35·1·68, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 57,
Laws of Utah 1955, as amended by Chapter 62, Laws of Utah 1957, as
amended by Chapter 55, Laws of Utah 1959. as amended by Chapter 71.
LJws of Utah 1961, as amended by Chapter 49, Laws of Utah 1963, as
amended by Chapter 68, Laws of Utah 1965, as amended by Chapter 65,
Laws of Utah 1967, as amended by Chapter 86, Laws of Utah 1969, as
amended by Chapter 76. Laws of Utah 1971, as amended by Chapter 67,
Laws of Utah 1973. as amended by Chapter 101. Laws of Utah 1975, as
amended by Chapters 151 and 156, Laws of Utah 1977, is amended lo read:

Second injury fund created-Purpose-Funding-Injury causing death-Filing claim within one year-Payment into fund when
no dependents-Payment to dependents-Presumptions of dependency-Payment to partially dependent persona-Effect of remar·
riage.

35·1-68.

1li
There is created a second injury fund for the purpose of making pay·
ments in accordance with the provisions of chapters 1 and 2 of this title.
This fund shall succeed lo all monies heretofore held in that fund designated
as the "special fund" or the "combined injury fund" and whenever reference
is mJde elsewhere in this code to the "special fund" or the "combined injury
fund" that reference shall be deemed lo be lo the second iniury fund. The
stJte treasurer shall be the custodian of the second injury fund and the com·
mission shall direct its distribution. Reasonable administration assistance
mav he paid from the proceeds of that fund. The attorney general shall
appoint a member of his st~iff to represent the second in3ury fund in all pro·
ceedings hrought to enforce claims against it.

121
In case injury c.:iuses de.:ith within the period of six years from the
d.:iteor the ,1ccident. the employer or insurance carrier shall pay the burial
expen,es of the decl'ased as provided in section 35-1-81, and further benefits
in tht· amounts ,lnd to the persons JS follows:

14+ If tAtrt' aH AS Eief!tAdeAtS, tAe tFRfllB)eP aAF.i iRi;1:1raRee eaFFieF shall
f+i+¥-+FH-++-lAt ldlL trLa'lolf_ tfiL SlolRl Af $ 1 },00Q. \A_ ela1FF1 rer e9FRJ3eRsatieA
H+H...+-4e--+++t>-J • 11 A tAt tl:lRHFI
1eR "1tA1A 0At 'ear frem tAe date ef deatR e{
4H h t J_ tr~, and, 1f ·H tAe eRd if eRl' ~·ear from tAe Gate 0[ EleatR ef tRe
1 l t t I. An ·l 11R1 fH PAR peR;atioR sAall Ra i: BeeA filed witA tRe eammis
1 A, t A
1 j _ 1FF1 u( ~ l 3.1300 _Rall Be 13a1d at tRat timt' iRte the stat1:: trea
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s1::1r:' 0'. tAL LFRplo: ep F.IP tt:le iRS1:1FaRee eaFPieP. This fli?)'FReRt sRall be
re dldPH'l A: tht 1Fflfl JRt if aRy "et::'d~ eemflt:Rsat10R pa:·ffieRts fJaiEl ts er Bue
tAt r:h:eLc1 td Int e1:1R tAe Bate ef tAe aeei8t::Rt aA0 A1s Beath. ~1:1el:t ~a:·meAt

&fir;.\\ he Reid lFI a S.JHe1al i1:1AEI f8F tf1e 131:1F13sses f)F8 iEled iR H1is title; the
otate treu.s1::1rer sRall Ae tAe e1::Jst00iaR ef s1:1eR s13eeial hrn0. a~a u~e eemmis
s10R sAall 81reet tRe .31striB1::1tieR tAereof. If the e0mm1ssi0A Ras reaseRably
8cterFRtRe0 tRat lAcre are Re EiepeR0eRts e( t~e 0eeeased. 1t ma} erdeP the
e-m-fJlfl: er er iAs1:1raRee eaPFier le ~ay !Ale the state treas1::1r. tAe SldFR s~eei
hLd rn lAif; s1:1bsH 1 i1rn 1 8 'ee AelEl iA n1at Sfleeial f1o1REI fer a fHFIBEi ef ORe )€3P
fpom the death of lAe Beeease£l. (' R. elaim file8 "1tRiA tint y~aP h~P .. ~ieh
1A a· aPd 1s marle R; bRt! eeFRFRissieR sA·1ll Re f.1ai8 01:1b ef the s1:1m Ftepesite8
b:' the eFRtJlff: t:P ep 1Rs1H'aRee earvier s~rere a'fly iurtRt::P elatFA ma; Be
asserteEi aE:"a1Rst the emf.1leyer eF 1Rs1::1raRee eaFFier.j
1

1a1 If the commission has made a determination that there are no dependents of the deceased. it mav, prior to a lapse of one year from the date of
de.J.th of a dece;:ised emplovee, issue a temporarv order for the employer or
insurance carnl·r to pay into the second tnJurv fund the sum of SI8.720. The

Sl~.720

shall be reduced by the amount of any weekly compensation pay-

death.

Should a dependency claim be filed subseyuent to the issuance of

ments paid to or due the deceased between the date of the accident and

such an order and, thereafter, a determination of dependency is made bv the
comm1ss1on, the award shall first be paid out of the sum deposited for credit
to the second 1n1ury fund by the emplover or insurance earner before any
further claim mav be asserted against the employer or insurance carrier. In
the event no dependencv claim is filed within one vear from the date of
death. the comm1ss1on's temporary order shall become permanent and final.
If no temporary order has been issued and no claim for dependency has
been filed w1th1n one vear from the date of death, the commission mav issue
a permanent order at any time requiring the carrier or emplover to pay
$18,720 into the second injurv fund.
Anv claim for compensation by a
dependent must be filed with the commission within one vear from the date
of de"th of the dece.1sed.

lbi Iii If there are wholly dependent persons at the time of the death.
the PaYment by the employer or insurance carrier shall be 66 213% of the
decedent's Jverage wel'kly wage at the time of the injury, but not more
thJn a maximum of 85°'o of the state average weekly wage at the time of
tht' inJury per week and not less than a minimum of S~5 per week plus SS
for a dependent spouse and $5 for each dependent minor child under the age
of eighteen years. up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children
not to exceed the Jverage weekly wage of the employee at the time of the
1niury, hut not to exceed 85°b of the state average weekly wage at the time
of the 1nJ1iry per wet>k. to continue during dependency for the remainder of
tht• pt>r1od ht>t'.\et'n the date of the death and not to exceed six years or 312
·' t·1·h ~dtn I ht· dc1te ol the in1ur:
1111 Tht> \\t't>klv
~t·r~ f1ill~~~ ~~ '.hl'

payment to wholly dependent persons during depenl"-p1rJt1nn of the first six vear period describ.ed in sub-. . •. ,• i1•:1 ...'.'ih_.11• -...h,ill bl· ,in ,1mnunt equal to the weeklY benefits paid to those
~h,~~~it'l~t~J('nt Pt'f"-ons durlnl) that ln1t1al Si'l>ycar p:riod, reduced bv
.)11'',) uf .1n\· \\t·ek1\ ft·dt·ral <>oc1al security death bene!lls paid to those
~h~t~ndt>nt p~r-...on~.
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11111 The issue of depe~dency shall be subject to review by the commis·
c;;ion at the end of the 1n1t1al six·ye.:ir period and annually thereafter. If in
anv <>uch review it ts dl'lermined that. under the facts and circumstances
existing at that time, the applicant 1s no Jong-er a wholly dependent person,
the applicant may be considered a partly dependent or non-dependent
person and shall be paid such benefits as the commission may determine
pursuant to subsection 12HcJliiJ.

1ivf For purposes of any dependency determination, a surviving spouse
of a deceased employee shall be conclusively presumed to be wholly dependent for a six-year per10d from the date of death of the employee. This presumption shall not apply after the initial six-year period and, in determining

the then existing annual income of the surviving spouse, the commission

shall exclude 50% of anv federal social security death benefits received by

that surviving spouse.

[~] lei Iii If there are partly dependent persons at the time of the death,
the payment shall be 66 213% of the decedent's average weekly wages at

the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum or 85% of the state

average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less than a
minimum of $45 per week, to continue during dependency for the remainder
of the period between the date of death and not to exceed six years or 312

weeks after the date of injury as the commission in each case may deter·

mine and shall not amount to more than a maximum of [~) $18,720.
The benefits provided for in this subsection shall be in keeping with the cir-

cumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the date of injury. and
any amount awarded by the commission under this subsection must be consistent with the general provisions of this title.
liil Benefits to persons determined to be partly dependent pursuant to
subsection 1211blliiil shall be determined by the commission in keeping with

the circumstances and conditions of dependency existing at the time of the
dependency review and may be paid in a weekly amount not exceeding the
maximum weekly rate that partly dependent person would receive if wholly
dependent.
liiil

Payments under this section shall be paid to such persons during

their dependency bv the employer or insurance carrier.

[\4-lj ldl If there are wholly dependent persons and also partly dependent
persons Jt the time of death, the commission may apportion the benefits as

it deems just and equitahle; provided, that the total benefits awarded to all
r.:irt1e<; concerned shall not exceed the maximum provided for by law.~
I 1 · 1Ag tRe peried dt1riflg "'AieA tAe effl:13la~ er BF its iR51:1FaRee earrier is
req1.:11nd ta riri.:· AL Refits HRLilF tRis aet, tAere sAall 9e fHi.i0 ts st1eR f'l€FSSAS,
lurrng tAe fleF.od of tAttr dcfleAdeRe., 8Ht r:if 1 Ae Sf)eeial f1::1R8 flFA' 1ded fer
Ht "'">-U4-i-.t--l:'t-toR 1 lJ, tAc
-1me Al At fits as p.11r:i A.' tRe eFA:fJle. er BF its IRSl:IFaAee
1-1-rlFf'-t+'-f'.,.-- 1 flPO' 1rlld 1R ,'l:lh'.lllJOA 121 ;rnd '3l. TfH' isst1e Bf defltR~
1-w ff.Ur.It· 1 d ·i.t tAt timt dpfJl1eat1LJR 1s madl for ·u:ld1t10R·il RtRtftts from Urn
't~-+-fl+fttkl

I )1 TIH eoFRFRl!'iSlflR <;f\'111 0r8Lr tRat tReFe Se fJai8 ts

s1:1eA defJeRBeRts,
1dtrl 1A .-- 1A<'ttt1HAS 12 ,rnd 1,'J•, AeAlfits at tAe rate sf 8~ 2 '3°'r:. sf tAe
l~llf"i "!'"LF3gl 'Llhl:·
agES lt tAe time t:d tRe iAJ1=lf2' b1::1t AOt more

rl-".-ftfH'

+.fl

t

t-fht.n ,, ma1ciW.HFR if >SSD'r

t

f •Re >tate a erage "eeld:·' age a· ·Pe ·we ef
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lAe IRjl1F_1 fH:P "eek aRB Reb less tRaR a m1A1m1:1m ef i 1~ fl€F
eek, e1::1t ef
tl'lat si:;eenl flrnEi flFO"Hlui fer iR s1:18seeti0R 1 1) aREi fer *Rat fl€Fie8 ef time
~eglARIAE';" .. itA tAe. time bfnt t~e 13a~'R=\eRtS t8 He ma8e 'e: the emrle: t:F OF
its lASIHaRee
ae~eAseAey.]

eaFF1EF

ltf'm1Rate

crnd

eR81Rg

l:lf)BR

tAe termiFntieR

ef

saiEl

!"'11 !_!'.! If there are wholly or partly dependent persons at the time of
death and the total amount of the awards paid by the employer or its insurance carrier to said dependents, prior to the termination of dependency,
including any remarriage settlement. does not exceed [~\ $18.720. the
employer or its insurance carrier shall pay the difference between the
amount paid and the sum of I~\ $18.720 into the!~\ second injury
fund provided for in subsection Ill.

Section 4. Section amended.
Section 35-1-71, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended by Chapter 151,
Laws of Utah 1971, is amended to read:

35-1·71. Dependents-Presumptions-Determinations.
The following persons shall be presumed to be wholly dependent for support upon a deceased employee:
I'll ,6 lrnsaaAa a• "'ife "~"" a s~e"se "'ith "h""' that iAai,,ia"al li><es at
toe time of the aeath.]
l~l l_!_I Children under the age of eighteen years or over such age, if
physically or mentally incapacitatedh\ and dependent upon the parent, with
whom they are living at the time of the death o( such parent, or who is
legally bound !or their support.

121 For purposes of payments to be made under subsection 12iibllil of section 35-1-68, a surviving husband or wile shall be presumed to be wholly
dependent upon a spouse with whom he or she lived at the time of the
emplovee's death.
In all other cases, the question of dependency, in whole or in part, shall
be determined in accordance with the facts in each particular case existing
at the time of the injury l•es"ltiAg iA tAe\ £! death o( such employee, except
for purposes of dependencv reviews pursuant to subsection 12Hblliii) of sec·
tion 35· l ·G8. [~\ No rerson shall he considered as a derendent unless he
or she is a memher oflhe family of the deceased employee, or bears [w-htffi\
the re\Jt10n o[ husband or wife, lineal descend;;int. ancestor. or brother or
sister. The word "child" as used in this title shall include a posthumous
child. and a child legallv adopted prior to the in;ury. Hall brothers and half
s1qns shall be included in the words "brother or sister" as above used.

Section 5. Section amended.
:-:.ect1nn "J.3-1-l·i, l'tah Code Annotated 1953. as amended by Chapter 57,
LJ>\'i nf l'tah 1955. c15 ..tmended by Chapter 55. Laws of Utah 1959, as
Jmt-"n(frd hv Chaptt·r i'l, Law-. of L1tah 1961. as amended by Chapter 49,
L1w-, of 1··L1h l~fi3, JS amended by Chapter f)8. Laws of Ut.:ih 1965, as
JmPnded hy Chapters 151 and 156, Laws of Ctah 1977, is amended to read:

231
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spondent.

gr.:i.ntcd J.n
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tlie state,

Hanson & Garrett, Salt Lake City, for

Statutes shoul<l

11

0.(•

that plaint if

..

I. Statutes c=:>IBl(2)
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Cite

llB

1:1 Cl.""\!1

ground th;it it was Larrc<l l1y the st;-i.tutc of
limitations.

~,J ~Joi

the time of limitation.
necessity must

The injuries resulted from an automobile
colh~1on neJ.r Springville in Utah County,

on December 1--1-, 1958.

st.1tc

general language.

nut statutes of

their ohjectives

in

It is not always possible

to foresee and prescribe in precise detail

Our statute of

for o.11 situations to which they might apply.

limitations on torts actions is four years.1

1\ttcmpts to give them universal and litero.l

It was not until four years and three days

application frequently \ea<l to incongruous

after the accident, on December 17, 1962,

results \\hich \\"ere never intended.

th:it pl:iintiff commcncul this :-iction.

it is obvious th:it this is so, the statute

To avoid the sto.tutc of \imitations, pbin-

~houkl

not lie so applied.

\Vhen

In order to give

tiff avers that the defrndants, who arc

a

residents of Caltfornia, returned there im-

cance it should be considered in the light

mediately after the o.ce1dcnt, where they

of its background and the purpose sought

have since remained.

She cites and relics

"If when a cause of action accrues
against a person when he is out of the
state, the action may Le commenced
within the term herein limited after
his return to the st;itc; and if after a

cause of actro11 accru,·s It,· departs fro111
the state, the time of his abse11a is not

u/

111,

,·n1<1Jl of t/1,·

)I(

the ti111,· l1m1t."d for the
11< /1e11"
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meaning and
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( Er11ph.1~1~

added.)
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to \Jc accomplished, tog-ether with other
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on Sec. 73-12-35, U.C.J\.1953:

('1irl

statute

:1

bcarin~

on the proUlcm involved.

[3-5]

It is obvious that the objective

of the st.'.l.tute above quotc<l

\\':IS

to prevent

a <lcfcndant from depriving- a plaintiff of
the opportunity of suing him Ly aLscntinghimsclf from the state <luring- the period of
limitation. 2
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.\1c) (1) U.R.C.P., which st:i.tcs that persr)n,:d c;cn ice may Le m;"ldc upon a <lcfcn<l-

"* * *

ant

l>y dcll\·cring a copy to

aii

plaintiff, that the defendants' absence from
the state tolled the running of the statute
of lim1t;i.tions, an action against

;i,

nonrcsi-

og.-nl 011t!tori::crl by nttoiut111t 11/ or by law

<lent motorist \\Ould pr.:ictic:'tlly ncycr Le:

tn rccc1\c service of process."

outlawed.

,1rldcd.

(Emphasis

The defendants thus h:1.d an agent

J

.\ purported claim coul<l rest

in suspense an<l an :i.ction coul<l Le com-

\\ 1th111 the state uprm ,,h0m procc.:;s cnuld

menced 10, 20 or any numlJCr of years after

loccn scr\'cd for them, ;ind they were

its orig111, C\'Cll though the pla1nt1ff could

1Ll\'C

thu.:; not ",1b.,cnt" from the .:;t:ttc in the sense
cr>11tl

mpbtcd l1y the <,Lllutc, tli.1t 1.:;, un-

fnr the scf\ ice nf process. Thcrc-

:t\':111.11,]c

fnre, tlic pl.1i11tiff w:l~

11qt

cr1mmc11c111g her act1011

,\t

sired

pre\ cnted from

have sued a11<l scr,·ed procc~s any time he

It seems to us that such a result

de<;ircd

would C!lmport with neither
tice.

rl'a~o11

11or jus-

Xor \\·ou!d it harmonize with the

any tl!ne she de-

policy of the law of allowing a rcasonaL!e

That being so, there exists no rea-

time for the bringing of an action, Lut of

"on for tolling the rnn111ng of the st:ltute.

providm~

\\'hen the reason for the rnle is gone, the

which 1t must lie brought or the m;\ttcr put

rule should vanish with it.

at rest.

.\ppropos is the

statemrnt of Justice Holmes:

\Ve are aware that some courts have

"ft is revolt111g to have no better rea-
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son for a rule than that it was so laid

deference to them, it is our opinion that for

down

It is

the reasons \\"e have hcruna\Jo\·c expressed,
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of f:ulurc of insur:rncc company's agent

The

to disclose material facts when he applied

action shoulJ \Jc dismissed, anJ it is so

to company for $10,000 fire policy on his

orJcrcd.

own

and :ire <lccmc<l to Le without merit.

No CO':>ls awarded.

property could lie tric<l

separately

frum issue of failure to <lisclosc material

J., and 'lcDOt\Ol:Gll,

HEO:R!OD, C.

CALLISTER and \\'.\DE,

JJ..

concur.

facts with respect to $20,000 fire policy.
..:\ffirmeU an<l cause remanded.
I. Appeal and Error C=931{1)

Conflicting evidence was re\·iewed. in

light most

fa\·oraLlc

to

finding

against

pl:iintiff-appcllant.
2. Trlal c=i9{1)

It was proper to allow issue in case

Meredith PAGE, Plalntlff and Appellant,

after pretrial eoufrrencc an<l order, where

v.
UTAH HOME FIRE INSURANCE COMPA·
NY, a Utah corporation, Defendant and Respondent.

l'()t1rt

3. Trlal C=349{1)

of l°t:lli.

The trial court <li<l not err in suLmit-

April!), l!Jfi.f.

ting special inkrrog:1torit.:s inste<1cJ of gen-

1\ction on $10,000 fire policy an<l on

$20,000 fire policy.

issue in that three wet:ks Ldorc trial the
court had granted motion to amend order
to include issue.

No. 9902.
Supreme

plaintiff hatl ample opportunity to meet the

On the L;i,sis of the

eral verJict <IS rcquesteU by plaintiff.

Rules

of Cini Procc<lurc, ruk 49(a).

jury\ findings, the Third District Court,
S.:t!t Lake County, !\fcrrill C. 17:.iux,

J..

cn-

4. Appeal and Error C=:922

Jurors arc prc~unlL<l tu Le oi or<linary

tcrc<l ju<lgmcnt di.:ny1ng- pLtintiff recovery
on uthcr policy and thcrct1 ftc: granted
new trial .1s to the ::;.\1),1!lll) Jl1!l1cy.

pl.1111t1ff

,1r~1c:ikd

,:ip1•l.1kd.
Pu11,,·1L'.h,

rhc

J,

.1.

The

:111.l tl1c dciL1HL1nt cru::.::.-

SuprL!TH.'

Clrnrt,

intcll1:;cnce.
5. Trial C=352(15)
I11tcrro~:ltOr)

:-.1c-

a~

to

\\hLth<.:r

insttrl'U

hcl<l th.1t tr1.1l judg-c d1<l not

knu\\ 11n:::l1

i:11kd to m.iJ...c full anJ honest

t1"n \\ ]H 11 he ur•krL'd nLw

d1~clu~11rc

of m:ltcri,il i.tcb to fire insurer

Jlq1~c !tis d1~cr\

\\,(>;

nut \ .q;uc :ind

11nc ...:r!,tt1\

HI

th:i.t jt1ry

